

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Board Action/Information Summary

☒ Action ☐ Information

MEAD Number:
201791

Resolution:
☐ Yes ☒ No

TITLE:

Metrorail Incident Near Farragut North

PRESENTATION SUMMARY:

The Department of Safety & Environmental Management (SAFE) will provide a preliminary briefing on the Metrorail incident near Farragut North Station on Tuesday, September 13, 2016.

PURPOSE:

In advance of the final investigative report, SAFE will provide the Board with a preliminary briefing of the events and findings to-date which resulted in two passengers self-evacuating the train on Tuesday, September 13, 2016. Further, the public preview provides transparency to our stakeholders, employees and the public in the Washington metropolitan area community.

DESCRIPTION:

WMATA continues to work towards strengthening the safety of the system for its employees and the public.

Key Highlights:

- There were two events that evening; USA Hockey at Verizon and Nationals Baseball games
- Train #101 was carrying a large number of passengers from these events heading outbound towards Shady Grove Station
- Departing Farragut North Station, Train #101 encountered a malfunctioning switch compounded by radio communication issues between the Train Operator and Operations Control Center
- While efforts were underway to return Train #101 to Farragut North Station, two customers self-evacuated and were discovered on the roadway and escorted safely to the platform
- Train #101 pulled back into Farragut North and departed outbound to Shady Grove station
- There were no reported injuries

Background and History:

On September 13, 2016, at approximately 10:04 PM outbound Red Line train #101 to Shady Grove Station entered the pocket track due to schedule single track operations supporting track work between Farragut North and DuPont Circle Stations. A switch malfunction prevented Train #101 from continuing its scheduled route and compounding the incident were radio issues between the Rail Operations Control Center (ROCC) and the Train Operator of train #101. Further assistance to Train #101 was made by track maintenance supervisor providing the operator a portable handheld radio. During this transition from the front to rear of train #101 to return back into the station, a maintenance unit reported a customer on the roadway. The customer was escorted to Farragut North station platform. As efforts to return train #101 to the station continued, a second customer was reported on the roadway and was also escorted to the station platform. At approximately 10:36PM, a responding Rail Transportation Supervisor operated Train #101 back to Farragut North Station and prepared the train to depart outbound to Shady Grove station. The duration of this incident was approximately 32 minutes.

Discussion:

The Chief Safety Officer (CSO) will present a preliminary review of the incident and findings to-date as the investigation continues.

FUNDING IMPACT:

Define current or potential funding impact, including source of reimbursable funds.	
Project Manager:	CSO - Pat Lavin
Project Department/Office:	SAFE

Information item only; no additional funding is required at this time.

TIMELINE:

Previous actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• None
Anticipated actions after presentation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Continue the investigation into the incident of September 13, 2016• Implement necessary corrective actions as a result of the investigation• Continue to strengthen safety culture

RECOMMENDATION:

To inform the Board's Safety Committee of the incident on September 13, 2016 and ongoing investigation.




Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

MetroRail Incident near Farragut North Metro Station

Safety Committee
September 22, 2016



Timeline of Events



Time Between Train Entering Pocket Track and Self Evacuation = **18 Minutes**


Total Incident Time = **32 Minutes**




Preliminary Findings

- Switch #7 blocked and clamped in reverse position
- ROCC failed to remotely place an auxiliary switch call on Switch #7
- Route into the pocket track is established for non-revenue train #822
- Switch #7 went out of correspondence due to non-revenue train entering pocket track

Non-Revenue Train Diagram



Incident Train Diagram





Preliminary Findings

- Train #101 proceed to Track #3 while Switch #7 was out of correspondence
- ROCC made several attempts to contact Train #101 to no avail
- Field Personnel were instructed to make contact with Train #101 to communicate ROCC instructions
- Radio Communication was affected due to car mounted radio had a defect



Preliminary Findings

- Train #101 instructed to operate back to Farragut North
- Two Customers self evacuated and safely escorted to Farragut North
- “Doors Closed Indication” was not received by operator
- Event Recorder being analyzed
- Rail Supervisor boards train and operates back to Farragut North



Immediate Actions

- Communication assessment of affected area
- Assessment of car mounted radios
- Recommended a revision to the Metro Safety Rules and Procedures Handbook related to necessary communication actions taken when Train Operators are stopped behind red signals



Immediate Actions

- ROCC Management develop a lessons learned document for staff with an emphasis on rules related to:
 - Blocking and clamping switches
 - Train evacuation procedures
 - Communications with Public

This page intentionally left blank.